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FIFTH CIRCUIT CASES CONCERNING
SEARCH AND SEIZURE UPON THE HIGH
SEAS: THE NEED FOR A LIMITING DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, illegal smuggling of marijuana into the
United States has increased dramatically.1 As a result, the
number of arrests off the coast of the United States by Coast
Guard officials has also increased. The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has been the primary court to handle appeals arising from
cases involving searches and seizures conducted by the Coast
Guard upon the high seas.2 One statute, 14 U.S.C. § 89a,3 has been
Drug-related seizures by the Coast Guard upon the high seas for the years 1973-1978:







Interview with Mr. Leo Loftus, Chief of Media Relations, Editorials Branch of the Coast
Guard's public affairs section, March 10, 1980. According to Mr. Loftus, most of the seizures
were carried out in the Miami area; however some took place near and around New
England.
2 Major Coast Guard operations centers are located at Miami, Florida and New Orleans,
Louisiana and serve as home port for several Coast Guard cutters patrolling the United
States coastline. Venue is appropriate in the district court to which the defendant is first
brought after an offense has been committed at sea, 18 USC § 3238 (1976); apparently, the
Coast Guard has the authority to carry defendants into any district desired and consequently
more defendants are carried into districts near the Coast Guard's home port areas which is
Fifth Circuit territory.
Additionally, many of the vessels seized were sailing courses, which if undisturbed,
would have landed them without the Fifth Circuit's jurisdictional area.
The term 'high seas' means all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial or
in the external waters of a state. Article I, Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
The text of 14 U.S.C. § 89 reads:
(a) The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches,
seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States
has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of
laws of the United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty
officers may at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or
to the operation of any law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on
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relied on in support of the Coast Guard's authority to engage in
these searches and seizures.
Because the literal text of section 89a purports to authorize the
Coast Guard to search and seize any vessel upon the high seas
which is subject to the jurisdiction or operation of a law of the
United States, without requiring the presence of probable cause
or a search warrant, defendants whose presence before the court
was secured through the Coast Guard's reliance upon section 89a
usually have asserted a two-pronged attack upon the statute.
First, defendants have argued that the Coast Guard did not have
authority over the particular area in which their vessel was seized,
and second, they have maintained that section 89a does not com-
port with the warrant requirements of the fourth amendment.'
This Note examines the course charted for searches and seizures
by the Fifth Circuit. The initial focus is on the history of section
89a, followed by a review of the interpretations the Fifth Circuit
has rendered concerning the question of whether section 89a is
valid in authorizing the Coast Guard to search and seize vessels
beyond 12 miles of the United States coastline. Analysis is then
made of the Fifth Circuit holdings that section 89a is constitu-
tional even though it purports to authorize searches and seizures
board, examine the ship's documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and
search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance. When from
such inquiries, examination, inspection, or search it appears that a breach of the
laws of the United States rendering a person liable to arrest is being, or has been
committed, by any person, such person shall be arrested or, if escaping to shore,
shall be immediately pursued and arrested on shore, or other lawful and approp-
riate action shall be taken; or, if it shall appear that a breach of the laws of the
United States has been committed so as to render such vessel, or the merchan-
dise, or any part thereof, on board of, or brought into the United States by, such
vessel, liable to forfeiture, or so as to render such vessel liable to a fine or penalty
and if necessary to secure such fine or penalty, such vessel or such merchandise,
or both, shall be seized.
(b) The officers of the Coast Guard insofar as they are engaged, pursuant to the
authority contained in this section, in enforcing any law of the United States
shall:
(1) be deemed to be acting as agents of the particular executive department or
independent establishment charged with the administration of the particular law;
and
(2) be subject to all the rules and regulations promulgated by such department
or independent establishment with respect to the enforcement of that law.
(c) The provisions of this section are in addition to any powers conferred by law
upon such officers, and not in limitation of any powers conferred by law upon such
officers, or any other officers of the United States.
See U.S. v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir.
1978); U.S. v. One 43 Foot Sailing Vessel, 538 F.2d (5th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Warren, 578 F.2d
1058 (5th Cir. 1978).
upon the high seas without a search warrant or a showing of prob-
able cause.
II. THE HISTORY OF SECTION 89a
The present-day 14 U.S.C. § 89a was enacted to give the Coast
Guard authority to board, search and seize American vessels upon
the high seas.' Prior to the enactment of this statute, judicial deci-
sions conflicted sharply over the issue of whether the Coast Guard
could lawfully search and seize an American vessel beyond 12
miles of the American coastline.6 In 1927, the Supreme Court
decided the case of Maul v. U.S.7 In Maul, officers of the Coast
Guard seized an American vessel 24 miles from the coast and gave
her to the collector of customs claiming liability to forfeiture for
violation of United States navigation laws. Libel proceedings filed
against the vessel were dismissed by the district court "on the
theory that officers of the Coast Guard were without authority to
seize the vessel at sea more than 12 miles from the coast."8 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed;9 since it had been
established that reasonable cause existed to believe that a law of
the United States was being violated, the Coast Guard could seize
the vessel despite the statutory limits of its power."° The Supreme
I A BILL To DEFINE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COAST GUARD, H.R. REP. No. 2452, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1936).
For purposes of the jurisdiction of the courts of the sovereignty whose flag it flies, a
vessel is deemed to be a part of the territory of that sovereignty and retains that
characteristic even while within the territorial limits of another state. United States v.
Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933). If an offense is committed aboard a vessel while within the ter-
ritorial limits of another state, American courts can assert jurisdiction over the aefendant
when he returns or is returned to American jurisdictional territory. This well recognized
principle yields to the right of the territorial state to assert jurisdiction over offenses com-
mitted on board the vessel which disturbs the peace and tranquility of the port. See
Wildenhus's Case (Mali v. Keeper of Common Jail), 120 U.S. 1 (1886).
It should be stressed that the jurisdiction in question is that of the district court once the
defendant has returned or has been returned to U.S. territory. It is not a question of
whether the Coast Guard or any other federal law enforcer could enter the territorial limits
of another state, arrest, seize and return the defendant to the United States. On this point,
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 44
(1962).
' Cases that allowed jurisdiction beyond the 12 mile limit include: The Rosalie M., 4 F.2d
815 (S.D. Tex. 1925); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); The Underwriter, 6 F.2d 937
(D. Conn. 1925). Cases that did not allow jurisdiction beyond 12 miles include: The Apollon,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 361 (1824); United States v. Bentley, 12 F.2d 466 (D. Mass. 1926); The
Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
274 U.S. 501 (1927).
' 6 F.2d 937 (D. Conn. 1925).
13 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1926).
Id at 434.
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Court affirmed the ruling of the Second Circuit, but relied on sec-
tion 3072 of the Revised Statutes1 to support its conclusion. That
statute stated that "it shall be the duty of the customs to seize
and secure any vessel or merchandise which shall become liable to
seizure by virtue of any law respecting the revenue as well
without and within their respective districts." The phrase "as well
without and within their respective districts" was given a broad
construction to encompass the area of the high seas. Otherwise
the Court reasoned, "vessels violating the revenue laws and
thereby incurring liability to forfeiture could escape seizure by
departing from or avoiding waters within customs districts."12
Justice Brandeis, in a concurring opinion," disagreed with the
statutory construction given by the majority. He was concerned
that the construction given the Coast Guard's authority by the
majority was too limited and failed to accomodate other duties
and responsibilities of the Coast Guard which extended beyond
the mere enforcement of revenue laws." For Brandeis, instead of
searching for express statutory authorization based on the par-
ticular law violated, the question for decision was whether the
Coast Guard had the power to seize American vessels beyond the
12 mile limit regardless of the particular law violated." He felt
that "authority exists because it is to be implied as an incident of
the police duties of ocean patrol which Congress has imposed upon
the Coast Guard.' 6
Justice Brandeis launched into a history of the Coast Guard and
its authority. He noted that the Coast Guard was established in
1915 by consolidation of the Revenue Cutter and the Life Saving
Services and were charged with the duty to enforce all maritime
laws of the United States. The duties of the Revenue Cutter Ser-
vice had been expanded continually into many areas of operation
since its establishment and the act of 1915 creating the Coast
Guard "did not add or abridge in any respect existing duties of
revenue cutters. It merely transferred the duties and powers
theretofore possessed."'8 It was noted that certain previously
" Section 3072, Revised Statutes, 19 U.S.C. § 506 (1799); Act of March 1799, 1 Stat. 627,
ch. 22, § 70.
" 274 U.S. at 511.
'8 Id. at 512, joined by Justice Holmes.
1, Id. at 512-13.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 512.
I An Act to create the Coast Guard, 38 Stat. 800, ch. 20 (1915).
274 U.S. at 515.
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enacted statutes had provided for the boarding of American
vessels beyond the territorial limits 9 and, when it was deemed
necessary, American vessels had been seized upon the high seas.0
Justice Brandeis, after this historical overview, concluded that
the Coast Guard had authority to arrest American vessels upon
the high seas no matter what the law violated or the place of
seizure."'
After the Supreme Court's decision in Maul, Congress thought
it necessary to enact a bill defining the jurisdiction of the Coast
Guard. Congress was concerned that "in the future it is possible
that, based upon some expressions in the majority opinion, the
contention will be made that express authority of law is necessary
to secure enforcement by the Coast Guard of some laws and also
to give jurisdiction to enforce those laws beyond the twelve mile
limit."22
The House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries in
charge of the bill readily utilized the concurring opinion of Justice
Brandeis in Maul. Certain sections of his opinion were reproduced
verbatim in the report to the full House. 23 On June 22, 1936, sec-
tion 89a was enacted into law. 4
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE25
This Note deals with the following four situations, three of
which the Fifth Circuit has already considered concerning the
" See e.g., 274 U.S. at 521:
"The express authority to board and search in terms beyond the territorial limits
of the United States first appeared in Section 31 and 64 of the Custom-Collection
Act of August 4, 1970, c. 35, 1 Stat. 145, 164, 175, which established the Revenue
Cutter Service. The authority there conferred upon it was to board and search
within 'the United States or within four leagues of the coast.' It applied to all
vessels-foreign as well as American; but was limited to in bound vessels."
" 274 U.S. at 525-26 and n. 29.
Id. at 531.
A BILL To DEFINE THE JURISDICTION OF COAST GUARD, H.R. REP. No. 2452, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1936). (hereinafter HOUSE REPORT 2452).
" The deference given the concurring opinion is illustrated by the statement contained in
the report: "Your committee concurs in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis that ... the
Coast Guard is authorized to search American vessels subject to forfeiture under our laws,
no matter what the place of the seizure and no matter what the law violated." HOUSE
REPORT 2452, supra note 22.
4 49 Stat. 1820, ch. 705, sec. 1; 14 U.S.C. §§ 45, 46 (1936).
There are two jurisdictional issues: subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdic-
tion. Subject matter jurisdiction is discussed within the context of this Note. The question
of personal jurisdiction requires only summary treatment from the Fifth Circuit which has
long been a proponent of the "Kerr-Frisbie" rule. According to this principle, a defendant in
a federal criminal trial whether citizen or alien, whether arrested within or beyond the ter-
19801
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Coast Guard's authority pursuant to section 89a: first, the Coast
Guard's authority to stop, search and seize any American vessel
upon the high seas; second, the Coast Guard's authority to stop,
search and seize any foreign vessel upon the high seas; third, the
Coast Guard's authority to stop, search and seize any American
vessel in foreign territorial waters; and fourth, the Coast Guard's
authority to stop, search and seize a foreign vessel in another
foreign state's territorial waters. The fourth situation is
hypothetical, but the trend established by the Fifth Circuit in
deciding the first three situations leaves little doubt that faced
with the question, the court would allow such a boarding, despite
commonly understood standards of international law.
The United States is a signatory to both the Convention on the
High Seas26 and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone.27 Article 228 of the Convention on the High Seas
proclaims the freedom of the seas for all. Accordingly, no nation
may exercise sovereignty over them. 9 Article 24 1 of the Conven-
ritory of the United States may not successfully challenge the district court's jurisdiction
over his person on the grounds that his presence before the court was unlawfully secured.
United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975); Kerr v. Ill., 19 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie
v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
" Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
" Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 1516 U.N.T.S. 205.
Article 2 states:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject
any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under
the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international
law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms and others which are recognized by the general principles of in-
ternational law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the in-
terests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.
9Id.
Article 24 states:
1. In a zone of the high seas continguous to its territorial sea, the coastal
State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regula-
tions within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its territory
or territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
3. Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other,
neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the con-
NOTE
tion on the Territorial Sea and the Continguous Zone limits a
country's contiguous zone to 12 miles. Within the 12 mile limit, a
country exercises plenary jurisdiction over all vessels, subject
only to the requirement that passage by foreign vessels may not
be interfered with unreasonably. 1
A. United States Vessels on the High Seas
Defendants arrested outside the contiguous zone frequently
argue that the United States Coast Guard does not possess the
authority to board and seize vessels past the 12 mile limit in viola-
tion of international law. In U.S. v. Odom," the Coast Guard
observed a vessel 200 miles from shore traveling toward the
United States. After determining that the vessel was regis-
tered in the United States, a routine safety and documenta-
tions examined was ordered. In the vessel's hatch, several un-
marked burlap bags containing marijuana were found. Although
the government contended that the "search should be governed
by border search standards"33 and held permissible as long as
"reasonable suspicion existed to believe that contraband was on
board,"' the Fifth Circuit found it unnecessary to rule on that con-
tention. Under section 89a, authority was found for the Coast
Guard to make examinations, seizures and arrests of American
vessels upon the high seas even in the absence of reasonable
suspicion. 5
In U.S. v. Warren," the Coast Guard stopped another American
vessel 700 miles from shore headed away from the United States.
A routine inspection uncovered firearms, large amounts of
unregistered currency and a small amount of marijuana. The ma-
jority opinion held that pursuant to the authority conferred by
trary, to extend its contiguous zone beyond the median line every point of which
is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of
the territorial seas of the two States is measured. (Emphasis added).
"I United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1065 and n. 4 (5th Cir. 1978).
n 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1976).
" Id at 341.
Although the government contended that the search should be treated using border
patrol standards, the type of random search conducted by the Coast Guard is more akin to
the roving patrol which the Supreme Court held violative of the Constitution in Almedia-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). The place of the search was neither a perma-
nent nor a permanent-temporary checkpoint within the territorial limits of the United
States as discussed in United States v. Hart, 506 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1975). Instead the search
took place 200 miles outside of the United States territorial limits.
, Id. at 341-42.
" Id at 342.
578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978).
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section 89a, the Coast Guard could apprehend and board any
vessel under the American flag. The court held that this authority
is plenary when exercised beyond the 12 mile limit. 7 From these
interpretations, it is clear that section 89a will be read to reach
across the high seas to any American vessel.'
B. Foreign Vessels on the High Seas
Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas 9 states that every
nation exercises exclusive jurisdiction over its flag vessels on the
high seas; therefore, no other nation has authority under interna-
tional law to search and seize an American vessel on the high
seas, and officials of the United States are subject to the same
restrictions on the seizure of foreign vessels on the high seas.
However, this reasoning was undermined by the Fifth Circuit's
decision in U.S. v. Cadena.'0
In Cadena, the Coast Guard boarded a Canadian freighter in in-
ternational waters and arrested its Colombian crew after finding
marijuana aboard.'1 The vessel was sailing in the direction of the
United States. The Fifth Circuit refused to apply the provisions of
the Convention on the High Seas, which explicitly prohibited the
Coast Guard's seizure of a foreign vessel at sea. The court held
that although both Canada and Colombia signed the treaty,
neither country had ratified it, and that article 32 of the treaty re-
quired each country to ratify the treaty.'2 Therefore, citizens of
Id. at 1064. In addition, under international law, registration alone makes a vessel sub-
ject to all of the rules and regulations of the country of registration. Convention on the
High Seas, supra note 26 at article 5.
578 F.2d at 1064.
" The full text of article 6 reads:
1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional
cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in these articles, shall be
subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. A ship may not change its
flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case of a real transfer of
ownership or change of registry.
2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them accord-
ing to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect
to any other State, and may be assimilated to a ship without nationality.
585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1979).
" The crew was Colombian and there was a Colombian certificate indicating that the ship
had been inspected for rates in 1976, but the ship's registration was Canadian.
2 585 F.2d at 1261. The Court also rejected the defendants' contentions that since the
treaty simply restated principles of international law, they had standing to assert the
underlying doctrines of the treaty.
It can be argued that the court committed a non sequitur in its reasoning. It does not
follow from the fact that Colombia and Canada have not ratified the Convention that the
United States, which has ratified it, is not constrained from exercising authority over a
Canadian vessel and Colombian crew on the high seas.
these countries were not entitled to the protections of the treaty.
However, in looking to national law to decide the case, the Fifth
Circuit conceded that it could find no statute that expressly ex-
tended the Coast Guard's authority to a foreign vessel over 200
miles from the American shore, and recognized that if the Coast
Guard possessed such authority, it must be implicitly embodied
within section 89a." In finding this authority, the panel observed
that for a number of years, the United States has adhered to the
objective view of jurisdiction." The objective view of jurisdiction
holds that the jurisdiction of United States courts extends to per-
sons whose acts have an effect within the territorial United States
even though most of the overt acts take place outside of the
United States. The defendants aboard the foreign freighter had
been engaged in conspiracy to violate federal narcotics statutes 21
U.S.C. §§ 952 and 963 by attempting to import marijuana into the
United States. Importation, by definition, must begin in another
country; therefore, the panel reasoned, Congress must have in-
tended 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 963 to apply to persons who engaged in
activities commenced extraterritorially." Because such activity is
within the operation of a law of the United States, a foreign vessel
may be searched and seized 200 miles from the American shore."
Jurisdiction over the offense confers authority on the Coast
Guard under section 89a.47
Due to previous constructions of section 89a and article 6 of the
Convention on the High Seas, the Coast Guard already possessed
authority to search and seize American vessels any place upon the
high seas. The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Cadena made it clear that
since jurisdiction over the offense would confer authority under
section 89a, foreign vessels would no longer enjoy immunities
from searches and seizures upon the high seas despite the man-
date of article 6, due to the application of the objective view of
jurisdiction.
I8 d. at 1259.
The jurisdiction of the United States courts extends to persons whose acts have an ef-
fect within the territorial United States even though most of the overt acts take place out-
side of the United States. However, at least one overt act within the United States must be
proved. U.S. v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 982-83 (5th Cir. 1975).
585 F.2d at 1259.
In United States v. Johnson, 578 F.2d 1347, 1366 (5th Cir. 1978) it was said that an overt
act within the United States is not necessarily a condition to the application of 21 U.S.C. §
963 (1970). Arguably, then, proof of an overt act within the United States is no longer re-
quired for jurisdictional purposes and that mere proof of intended territorial effects is suffi-
cient.
585 F.2d at 1259.
' United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1979).
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One question left by the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Cadena
was how this interpretation would actually affect subsequent con-
structions of the terms of the Convention on the High Seas and
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone by the
Fifth Circuit. In early 1979, the Fifth Circuit was given an oppor-
tunity to pass on that question. In United States v. Postal,8 the
Coast Guard, apparently in violation of article 6 of the Conven-
tion on the High Seas, searched and seized a foreign vessel out-
side of the United States' 12 mile limit as the vessel was sailing
away from the United States. The ship was found to be carrying
over 80,000 pounds of marijuana. The defendants asserted two
arguments. First, they contended that the boarding of their
vessel, 9 which violated treaty obligations of the United States,
operated to deny the district court jurisdiction because the United
States had imposed a territorial limitation upon its own authority
by entering into the treaty. Therefore, the United States lacked
the power to subject the vessel to its laws. 0 The second argument
" 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979).
"' The Coast Guard boarded the vessel twice. The first boarding was held authorized by
article 22 of the Convention on the High Seas. Article 22 states that when there is
reasonable ground for suspecting:
1 ...
(c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in
reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
2 ... If suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it [the war-
ship through its officers] may proceed to further examination on board the
ship, which must be carried out with all possible consideration.
The court felt that ample grounds for the Coast Guard to suspect the vessel's nationality
existed here. The vessel was flying no flag and exhibited no name or home port on her
stern. An officer of the Coast Guard boarded and was given documents he requested,
among which was a certificate of Grand Cayman registry. The Officer having determined
the nationality of the vessel was ordered to return to his ship. 589 F.2d at 867.
The second boarding took place as a customs search two and a half to three hours after
the first boarding and at about a distance of 16.3 miles from the nearest United States
coastline. Since at this time the Coast Guard knew the vessel to be of foreign nationality,
the boarding was in disregard of article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas. See n. 39.
1 This argument is premised on the results reached by the Supreme Court in the case of
Cook v. United States 288 U.S. 102 (1933) and Ford v. United States 273 U.S. 593 (1927). In
those cases, as in Postal, there was a treaty containing provisions which were violated by
law enforcement officials. In Cook, the Supreme Court dismissed jurisdiction over a British
vessel seized for smuggling liquor into the United States in violation of a treaty with Great
Britain. The Court held that the United States had imposed a territorial limitation upon its
own authority by entering the treaty and therefore lacked power to subject the vessel to
its laws.
Ford involved prosecution for conspiracy to violate the same liquor smuggling statutes.
Had the defendants raised timely objections to the Court's jurisdiction, the court hinted
that the result would have been the same as was reached later in Cook.
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was that the Coast Guard lacked statutory authority to seize their
foreign vessel past the 12 mile limit.
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that where the terms of a treaty
are involved, such violations by enforcement officials may deprive
the United States courts of jurisdiction over persons and property.
However, the court noted that only self-executing treaties could
operate to limit jurisdiction.51 The court took notice of the
domestic law of the states which signed the treaty,52 the history of
the United States assertion of jurisdiction over vessels on the
high seas,53 case authority,5 and congressional hearings on the
ratification of the treaty,55 and concluded that the treaty was not
self-executing and the United States in adopting article 6 did not
intend to limit its traditionally asserted jurisdiction over vessels
upon the high seas."
Addressing the Coast Guard's authority to board a foreign
vessel beyond 12 miles of the coast, the panel cited Cadena and its
holding that vessels become subject to the jurisdiction or to the
operation of any law of the United States if they are engaged in a
conspiracy to violate federal narcotics statutes. 7
Under the authority of 14 U.S.C. § 89a, the Coast Guard may ap-
prehend and board any vessel of the American flag upon the high
seas.' This authority is plenary when exercised beyond the 12
mile limit and need not be founded on any particularized suspi-
589 F.2d at 875.
Id. at 878.
5 Id. at 879.
5' Id. at 879-80.
Id. at 881.
Id. at 884.
However, the information analyzed by the court falls far short of establishing American
control over foreign vessels at sea. The authority cited shows searches of foreign vessels
only within twelve miles of the coast: An Act To Provide More Effectually For The Collec-
tion of Duties, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 145 (1790) (foreign vessels bound for the United States could
be boarded a d manifests examined and cargoes inspected). Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 187 (1804) (approving the language of the preceeding act). The Betsy 3 F.Cas.
303,304 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (interpreting a later, but similar statute).
The court also noted that the President may designate customs enforcement zones which
extend beyond United States territory. These zones may be temporarily designated by the
President only after a vessel has been sighted in a particular area and may extend only 62
miles from the coast. 19 U.S.C. §§1701-1711 (1976).
See also United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1259 (5th Cir. 1978) where the court,
citing United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412 (1820), said that the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1976) extends to
the high seas, but does not cover foreign vessels.
57 Id.
" United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1976).
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cion. 69 Section 89a also confers authority over foreign vessels
because at certain times they, too, are subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States, given the application of the objective view of
jurisdiction and a showing of the violation of United States nar-
cotics law.w
After initially construing section 89a to apply to any American
vessel, the Fifth Circuit has now extended that construction to
apply to foreign vessels upon the high seas as well. In reviewing
the history of section 89a, there can be little doubt that in Maul
Justice Brandeis concerned himself specifically with the power of
the Coast Guard to seize American vessels beyond the 12 mile
limit."' Although he found implicit authority to board American
vessels upon the high seas, in analyzing section 30592 which read
like a nascent section 89a, Justice Brandeis wrote that "Congress
cannot have intended to confer the general authority to seize
foreign vessels upon the high seas."'
A year before Justice Brandeis delivered his concurrence in
Maul, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, while recognizing the
Coast Guard's authority over domestic vessels beyond the 12 mile
limit, wrote:
[u~nder ordinary conditions, the United States would have no
authority in times of peace to search or seize a foreign vessel
beyond its territorial limitations, which is three miles, but
where treaties recognize or permit search and seizure to the
twelve mile limit, and this explanation is acquiesced in by other
nations ... it is clearly the intent of Congress ... to permit the
Coast Guard ... to make search and seizure for violation of the
law within the twelve mile limit.6"
While both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals were willing to recognize the Coast Guard's authority to
board, search, and seize an American vessel beyond the 12 mile
limit, neither court was willing to ascribe to Congress the power
to authorize the Coast Guard to search and seize foreign vessels
beyond the 12 mile limit.
" United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978).
60 United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1979).
" United States v. Maul, 274 U.S. 501 at 513 (1927).
Section 3059, Revised Statutes, ch. 201, 14 Stat. 178 (1866).
' 274 U.S. at 523. A footnote to that statement read:
Even under hovering laws, a sovereign may not seize a foreign vessel until it
enters the territorial waters. These do not extend beyond the three mile limit
(citations omitted). 274 U.S. at 523, n. 26.
The Underwriter, 13 F.2d 433, 434 (2d Cir. 1926).
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C. United States Vessels in Foreign Waters
Section 89a speaks in terms of the high seas. The term "high
seas" means all parts of the sea that are not included in the ter-
ritorial sea or in the external waters of a state.65 By definition, it
does not include the territorial waters of another sovereign state.
In U.S. v. Conroy,' a Coast Guard cutter pursued an Ameri-
can vessel into Haitian territorial waters and upon reaching
the vessel found 7,000 pounds of marijuana. The vessel and its
crew were seized. 7 The panel hearing the appeal found the search
and seizure in Haitian waters did not exceed statutory authority.
Although section 89a does not reach the territorial waters of
another country, the panel accepted the government's interpreta-
tion that "the phrase 'over which the U.S. had jurisdiction' was
not intended to be restrictive and the Coast Guard has implicit
power to search an American vessel in foreign waters even in the
absence of express authorization."68
The panel reached its conclusion after taking a historical look at
section 89a beginning with Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in
Maul. While acknowledging that section 89a did not address the
issue of arrest in foreign territorial waters, the panel concluded
that considering the broad language of the statute and the con-
gressional action subsequent to Maul, Congress did intend for the
Coast Guard to stop American vessels in foreign territorial
waters, absent objection from the foreign sovereign power. 9
The court buttressed its argument by citing language from the
debate by the participants to the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone, noting that the draftsmen rejected any
" See note 26 supra. at article I.
589 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1979).
'7 The Coast Guard requested and received the authorization of the Haitian Chief of Staff
to enter Haitian territorial waters. However, as the court noted, the mere consent of
foreign authorities to a seizure that would be unconstitutional in the United States does not
dissipate its illegality even though the search would be valid under local law. Id at 1265.
" 589 F.2d at 1265. The court could not utilize the provisions of the Convention on the
High Seas dealing with hot pursuit in making its decision. Article 23 of The Convention on
the High Seas delineates the right of hot pursuit. This right is applicable to a state's pur-
suit of a foreign vessel. The pursuit must be commenced when the ship or one of its boats is
"within the internal waters or the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing
State, and may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the
pursuit has not been interrupted."
"The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of
its own country or of a third state." Id. In this case, the Coast Guard was not pursuing a
foreign vessel, and if it had been, the right of hot pursuit ended as soon as the pursued ship
entered Haitian waters.
" 589 F.2d at 1267.
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requirement of previous authorization by a coastal state for the
entry of a foreign warship into territorial waters for innocent pur-
poses."0 It was determined from that rejection that among parties
to the Convention, a warship of one nation may enter the ter-
ritorial waters of another nation for innocent purposes without
first giving notification or receiving authorization.7'
The clear implication here is that even if the Coast Guard had
not sought and received the authorization of Haitian officials, the
entry into and the subsequent search and seizure within Haitian
waters would have been authorized by international law. If con-
sent by Haiti to a lawfully authorized search within their ter-
70 Id
In international law, Coast Guard vessels are classified as warships. See note 26 supra.
Article 8 § 2 provides:
For the purposes of these articles, the term "warship" means a ship belonging
to the naval force of a State and bearing the external marks distinguishing war-
ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the
government and whose name appears in the Navy List, and manned by a crew
who are under regular naval discipline.
7' The court's conclusion here can be controverted. It is true that prior to the codification
of the Convention On The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, there existed in interna-
tional law no right of innocent passage for warships. However, the actions of the drafters
do not support a conclusion that implicitly contained within the treaty is a right of innocent
passage for warships.
The International Law Commission (Commission) prepared a version article 24 to be con-
sidered for inclusion into the treaty on the territorial sea and contiguous zone. That article
stated that: "The coastal state may make the passage of warships through the territorial
sea subject to previous authorization or notification." 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW §18 at 411 (1965). The wording of the article was in direct response to interna-
tional dissatisfaction over the position taken by the Commission in the sixth session of 1954,
where the view was adopted that passage should be granted to warships without prior author-
ization or notification. Therefore, in its seventh session of 1955, the Commission amended
article 24 to stress the right of the coastal state to make the right of passage of warships
through territorial waters subject to previous authorization or notification. Id at 411-412.
In the eighth session, the Commission reconsidered the issue in light of comments from
other governments pointing out that in practice, passage was effected without formality
and without objection from the coastal state. However, the Commission saw no reason to
change its opinion. While it was a "laudable" attitude not to require previous authorization
or notification and a large number of states have dispensed with such a requirement, "this
does not mean that a state would not be entitled to require such notification or authoriza-
tion if it deemed it necessary to take this precautionary measure." Id at 412.
When article 24 was submitted to the plenary meeting for its adoption, an amendment
successfully passed which removed the words "authorization or" from the section. This new
wording, if adopted on final vote, would have meant that no previous authorization would
be necessary for a warship to enter territorial waters. However, on final vote, article 24
was defeated and did not become a part of the Treaty of the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone. Id at 416. This effectively left international law on the question
of innocent passage for warships in the same position it had previously enjoyed. Therefore,
since the rejection of previous authorization was followed by the rejection of the entire arti-
cle which specifically governed passage of warships, the court's finding of an implicit right
of passage is open to question.
ritorial waters would be sufficient to properly subject an
American vessel to the Coast Guard's authority, there still exist
two points of contention: first, whether, as the Fifth Circuit has
concluded, the international principle of entry for innocent
passage, standing alone, would have sanctioned the Coast Guard's
actions had it not received the express permission of Haiti; and
second, whether lawful authorization for the search and seizure
within Haitian waters can be found within or inferred from sec-
tion 89a.
The court's discussion of innocent passage is immediately suc-
ceeded by the court's recognition that innocent passage has
nothing to do with the authority of the Coast Guard to seize a
vessel in foreign territorial waters, but rather relates to the
rights between two nations. Citing The Richmond,"2 the court
stated that "the seizure of an American vessel within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of a foreign power, is certainly an offense
against that power, which must be adjusted between the two
governments."" Furthermore, the grant of the right of innocent
passage does not carry as a corollary the right to exercise
sovereign power within those territorial waters. The grant of in-
nocent passage is for the limited purpose of passage. Passage may
include stopping and anchoring, but only when such actions are in-
cidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force
majeure or by distress." Therefore, although a warship (e.g., a
Coast Guard cutter) of another state may be allowed to traverse
territorial waters, that warship is not given authority to exercise
sovereign powers while within those waters. Generally speaking,
one state may not enforce its rules of law by taking action within
the territory of another state.75
Current international law contains few provisions allowing one
state to exercise authority in the territorial waters of another
state. Article 196 of the Convention on the High Seas authorizes
" The Ship Richmond v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815).
73 589 F.2d at 1268, citing The Ship Richmond at 103.
7' See Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 1516 U.N.T.S. 205, at article 14, sec. 4.
7 The SS "Lotus," 11927] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10.
7' Article 19 reads:
Article 19
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State,
every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and
under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on
board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the
penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with
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every nation to seize a pirate ship or aircraft upon the high seas
or any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state. Article
23"1 recognizes a right of hot pursuit upon the high seas, but this
right ceases as soon as the pursued vessel enters the territorial
waters of another country. These articles illustrate the sanctity
with which the drafters (and signatories) of these international
treaties regarded territorial waters.
Even assuming arguendo that Congress has the authority to
permit the Coast Guard to conduct searches and seizures within
the territorial waters of another nation, it is important to deter-
mine when, if at all, Congress granted this authority to the Coast
Guard. The wording of the statute is unambiguous and Congress
in its modifications of section 89a appeared more concerned with
refining phraseology than expanding jurisdictional authority."8 It
regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties act-
ing in good faith.
" Article 23 reads:
Article 23
1. The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent
authorities of the coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has
violated the laws and regulations of that State. Such pursuit must be commenced
when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal waters or the ter-
ritorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be con-
tinued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not
been interrupted. It is not necessary that, at the time when the foreign ship
within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone receives the order to stop, the
ship giving the order should likewise be within the territorial sea or the con-
tiguous zone. If the foreign ship is within a contiguous zone, as defined in article
24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the pursuit
may only be undertaken if there has been a violation of the rights for the protec-
tion of which the zone was established.
2. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the ter-
ritorial sea of its own country or of a third State.
3. Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship has
satisfied itself by such practicable means as may be available that the ship pur-
sued or one of its boats or other craft working as a team and using the ship pur-
sued as a mother ship are within the limits of the territorial sea, or as the case
may be within the contiguous zone. The pursuit may only be commenced after a
visual or auditory signal to stop has been given at a distance which enables it to
be seen or heard by the foreign ship.
4. The right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military air-
craft, or other ships or aircraft on government service specially authorized to that
effect.
Except for minor revisions and amendments, the ambit of section 89a has remained
substantially unchanged.
In an Act of July 11, 1941, the proviso at the end of the first sentence was omitted. It
read: "Provided, that nothing herein contained shall apply to the inland waters of the U.S.,
its Territories, and possessions, other than the Great Lakes and the connecting waters
thereof" 55, Stat. 585, ch. 290, Sec. 7.
In 1946, the "phrase 'except the Philipine Islands' following 'possessions' in the first
is difficult to accept the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Conroy that
Congress would have intended that the Coast Guard have the
authority to enter foreign territorial waters to search and seize
American vessels. In reading both the present and the original
versions of section 89a, the unmistakable intent is that Congress
intended to give the Coast Guard absolute authority to search
American vessels upon the high seas. If Congress had intended to
confer the authority to board in foreign territorial waters, it could
have easily done so within the broad coverage of section 89a by
simply adding a few additional words. In fact, prior to 1959 a naval
regulation prohibited naval vessels from operating near or in
"claimed territorial waters without first obtaining permission
from higher authority."79 As previously stated, there existed in in-
ternational law no right of innocent passage for warships through
the territorial waters of another state at the time of that regula-
tion. Since there was no right to pass through another nation's
territorial waters for even innocent purposes, Congress could not
have intended to authorize the Coast Guard's entry into such
waters for purposes of questionable innocence contrary to na-
tional and international law."° There has been no indication that
the original congressional authorization of jurisdiction has been
expanded by Congress.
D. Foreign Vessels in Foreign Waters
Even more important than whether Congress intended the in-
terpretation espoused by the Fifth Circuit is the extreme to which
these interpretations might be extended. Under Conroy, the
Coast Guard has authority to stop American vessels anywhere
upon the high seas and even within the territorial waters of
sentence was omitted on the authority of 1946 Proc. No. 2695, cited to text and set out as a
note under section 1240 of title 48, Territories and Insular Possessions, which proclaimed
the independence of the Philipines." 14 U.S.C. § 45 (1946).
In August, 1949, 14 U.S.C. §§ 45-47, 51, 52, 66, 67, 107 and 33 U.S.C. § 755 were, for
the first time, combined and labeled section 89a. "The words 'or such merchandise' [were] in-
serted in the last clause of subsection (a) to provide for situations where it may be desirable
to seize merchandise without seizing the vessel."
"Changes were made in phraseology." H.R. REP. No. 557, 81st Cong., ch. 5, at 1551 (1952).
"The Act of August 3. 1950 amended subsection (a) to strike out the word 'to' preceding
examine' in the second sentence." Id.
" 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 18 at 417 (1965).
International law is a part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it
are duly presented for their determination .... [Wlhere there is no treaty, and no control-
ling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and
usages of civilized nations .... The Paquete Habana/The Lola, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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another state. When United States v. Cadena is read in conjunc-
tion with Conroy, the proposition is raised that the Coast Guard is
authorized to go into territorial waters of another state to search
and seize both American and foreign vessels."1 A foreign vessel
becomes subject to the jurisdiction or operation of a law of the
United States when it engages in a conspiracy to violate federal
narcotics law. Given the application of the objective view of
jurisdiction, the Coast Guard, acting in accordance with section
89a, would have authority to apprehend, search and seize the
vessel. If the vessel set sail for the territorial waters of a nearby
state, the Coast Guard, under the Fifth Circuit's construction of
the Coast Guard's "incidental powers," could also traverse that
state's territorial waters. At this point, the question of American
treaty obligations, both bilateral and multilateral, come into focus.
However, unless there exists a self-executing bilateral treaty with
the flag vessel's home state forbidding such a seizure in foreign
territorial waters, there is no good reason to believe that any
multilateral treaty would receive consideration different from
that given to the Convention on the High Seas and to the Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
In addition to its ability to go into foreign territorial waters
under its incidental powers, the Coast Guard, in accordance with
the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Conroy, could enter the foreign
territorial waters consistent with international law under the
principle of innocent passage. Even though the Coast Guard in
reality would be in pursuit of a vessel, under the Fifth Circuit's in-
terpretation, that foreign state should not object to the entrance
because the denial of the right of innocent passage must be to ex-
clude warships threatening or prejudicing the "peace, good order,
or security" of its coast.82
When questions of international law are involved, the issues go
beyond discovery of congressional intent to considerations of the
customs and laws of nations. The boarding of a vessel on the high
seas by its flag state is not an international event and the
ramifications and consequences remain essentially a domestic mat-
ter. However, the boarding of a foreign vessel is a matter of inter-
national concern calling for more restraint, or at least more cir-
cumspection, on the part of the boarding state." Whether the
" Under the Court's reasoning in Conroy, if the state was a signatory to the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, that state has given its prior implied permis-
sion not to object to a warship entering into its territorial waters. But see note 21 supra.
" 4 M. Whiteman, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 18 at 353 (1965).
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953).
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United States is willing to have another state's coastal police
enter its territorial waters to apprehend vessels pursuant to in-
cidental powers conferred by some foreign statute is a question
which must be considered. It is at least questionable whether the
signatories to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Con-
tiguous Zone meant to give other signatories the right to ap-
prehend and seize vessels in their territorial waters without their
express permission. The reciprocal interpretation of the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decisions lead only to the result that other states are able to
seize their own flag vessels and even foreign vessels within
American territorial waters. 4
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUE
A. Fifth Circuit Cases
Apart from the question of whether Congress could grant or
has granted the Coast Guard authority to board foreign vessels
upon the high seas or American vessels within the territorial
waters of another state, is the constitutional issue of whether sec-
tion 89a is valid, inasmuch as it purports to authorize boardings,
inspections, examinations, searches and seizures of any vessel
without requiring the Coast Guard to obtain a search warrant or
establish probable cause that a law of the United States is being
or has been violated. The Fifth Circuit's response has been to con-
strue section 89a to give the Coast Guard authority to board
vessels to conduct routine safety and documentation inspections
and to look for obvious customs violations. 5 For such purposes,
the Coast Guard may board a vessel at any time, regardless of the
distance from the American shore or the direction in which the
vessel is traveling, without a search warrant or probable cause.6
In United States v. One 43 Foot Sailing Vessel,7 the Coast
Guard observed a vessel near the Yucatan Channel proceeding
without lights. The Coast Guard, having decided to inspect the
vessel for afety and fishing violations, boarded the vessel and
was met with an "overpowering smell of marijuana."8 Officers
U Under international law, all states are equal. If State A is able to enter into the ter-
ritorial waters of another state in pursuit of its vessels or State B's vessels, other states
can likewise enter into State A's territorial waters in pursuit of its vessels or in pursuit
of State B's vessels.
United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978).
-Id.
405 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
Id. at 881.
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seized marijuana in plain view. The trial judge noted that the
violation of safety laws "by proceeding without lights at night was
sufficient cause and authority to board the vessel, and once
aboard, 'the overpowering aroma' of marijuana justified a search
of the vessel."" The Court then stated that, notwithstanding these
facts, no probable cause was required in order for the Coast
Guard to board and search the vessel pursuant to section 89a.9 °
The boarding was characterized as an "inspection .. .limited to
the vessel's safety equipment and other administrative details."9
The "direct and special interest of the United States in safety and
administrative control of vessels" operating under its authority
"justified administrative measures such as limited warrantless in-
spections and searches."9 The defendants appealed to the Fifth
Circuit, which, without elaboration, held section 89a to be con-
stitutional and expressly adopted the opinion of the court below.
One year later, in United States v. Hillstrom," Coast Guard of-
ficials and a United States customs agent, in a random stop, went
aboard a sailboat sighted in the Windward Passage between Cuba
and Haiti, some 500 miles from the United States coast, to conduct
a safety and documentation inspection. The facts reported do not
reveal probable cause for the boarding. 5 During the course of the
documentation inspection the Coast Guard, in order to ascertain
the identification number on the frame of the vessel, dislodged
several bales of marijuana in the hull. On appeal, the defendants
contended that the Coast Guard had prior suspicions of drug law
violations and sufficient time to obtain a search warrant before
boarding the vessel. The defendants also argued that the
presence of a drug enforcement agent during the inspection
tainted the validity of the alleged inspection, and that the Coast
Guard and the drug enforcement agent actually boarded the
vessel to search for narcotics violations and not to render a safety
inspection. The defendants pointed to the fact that the vessel was
500 miles from the United States shore and, being a sailing vessel,
was incapable of traveling great distances quickly, which il-
" Id at 882.
90 IdL
1 Id at 883.
92 Id
" United States v. One 43 Foot Sailing Vessel, 538 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1976).
" 533 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1976).
" 533 F.2d at 209-10. See also Brief.for Appellants at 13-16, United States v. Hillstrom,
533 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1976).
" Brief for Appellants at 18-19, United States v. Hillstrom, 533 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1976).
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lustrated the absence of "exigent circumstances" which would
have justified a warrantless search of the vessel. 7 The Fifth Cir-
cuit in its opinion simply stated that these contentions were "en-
tirely unwarranted" and that the Coast Guard acted under its
statutory authority pursuant to 89a to make inquiries and seizures
upon the high seas. 8
The current policy of the Fifth Circuit concerning the fourth
amendment issue is summarized in U.S. v. Warren,99 an en banc
hearing reversing a previous panel's decision which overturned
convictions of conspiracy to import marijuana and illegal transpor-
tation of more than $5,000 out of the United States.' 0 The Coast
Guard sighted the defendant's vessel some 700 miles from the
American shore heading away from the United States and decided
to conduct a random inspection and to look for obvious customs
violations.'0 ' In addition to Coast Guard personnel, a special agent
of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and a customs patrol of-
ficer were present. The drug agent had been assigned to assist
the Coast Guard in enforcement of federal narcotics laws and the
customs officer to look for customs violations. 2 In boarding the
vessel (without probable cause to believe that a violation of U.S.
law had occurred) the boarding party asserted that the purpose
was to conduct a "Coast Guard inspection."'03 The drug agent and
customs officer accompanied the Coast Guard officers and while
the Coast Guard proceeded with their safety inspection, the agent
and officer conducted an inspection of their own.'0 ' Neither set of
inspections uncovered anything more than "a small amount of
Id. at 13-16.
Compare Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970). In Chambers, while denoting the presence of probable cause, the Court justified the
search of a car, absent a warrant, which was stopped on the highway, relying on the ex-
igent circumstances that the car was a "fleeting target." In response to the argument that
the car could be followed until a warrant was obtained, the Court noted that the car might
be taken out of the jurisdiction. Id. at 51 and n. 9. This does not seem to be a valid concern
with respect to vessels at sea since the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard is apparently
limitless. See Part I supra.
533 F.2d at 210-11.
578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978).
The panel's decision is reported at 550 F.2d 219 (1977).
101 550 F.2d at 222, 223. For the statement that the Coast Guard also boarded the vessel
to look for obvious customs violations, see 578 F.2d 1058, 1068 and n. 9 (5th Cir. 1978).
101 550 F.2d at 223.
10 Id. The government contended on appeal that probable cause existed in that the
vessel, a shrimp boat, was in an area where no shrimping was done and did not have
shrimping nets out for use. The panel foundthis argument to be without merit. Id at 225 and
n. 5.
1" 550 F.2d at 223.
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marijuana" in defendant Cruse's nightstand. 5 After this, the
customs officer removed the defendants to the fantial of the
vessel and began to interrogate them to determine the purpose of
their trip and the amount of money aboard. Defendant Warren,
after a series of questions, finally admitting having $7000 aboard
and turned an envelope over to the customs officer. Warren claim-
ed that the envelope contained all the money aboard; however, the
DEA agent lifted a mattress and found several other envelopes
containing a total of $41,500 in U.S. currency and 46,800 Colom-
bian pesos.' 6 Thereafter, defendant Cruse admitted that the
vessel was on its way to Colombia to pick up marijuana; at that
point, the defendants were. arrested. 17
After conviction in the district court, the defendants appealed,
arguing that the warrantless search violated their fourth amend-
ment rights. The panel hearing the appeal agreed with the defend-
ants and reversed their convictions. 18 The panel wrote that the
Coast Guard may stop vessels upon the high seas when it has prob-
able cause to believe a crime is being or has been committed. It
also stated that if during a valid safety inspection, evidence is
discovered which provides probable cause to believe a crime is be-
ing or has been committed, the Coast Guard may extend the
search. However, "what is proscribed .. . is extending for no
reason a search for safety purposes beyond that which is
reasonably needed to determine if the safety and documentary
regulations have been followed."'0 9 The search was declared un-
constitutional because the Coast Guard, pursuant to 14 U.S.C. § 89a,
is not authorized to delegate its authority to members of other
branches of the federal government. The two agents who par-
ticipated in the search and procured all the evidence had no
authority to board the vessel, interrogate its crew, or search any
part of it. In addition, "the search of the vessel went beyond the
scope of a permissible safety inspection. Once aboard the vessel,
even the Coast Guard had no authority to interrogate the crew on
ally subject other than the safety and documentary inspection."'" 0
In reversing the earlier panel, the Fifth Circuit, en banc, held
that the participation of the two agents was authorized by 14 U.S.C.
105 Id
I"' Id The agent lifted the same mattress which defendant Warren had earlier lifted to
get the first envelope.
107 Id
.0 550 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1977).




§ 141b,"' which provides that the Coast Guard may avail itself of
officers or employees of other federal agencies to assist in the per-
formance of its duty. Alternatively, the agents' actions were con-
ducted jointly with the Coast Guard's; there was sufficient connec-
tion "to bring the agents under the aegis of the Coast Guard." '
The court held the search permissible as a valid safety and
documentations inspection under section 89a and asserted that
under that statute the Coast Guard is also authorized to look for
obvious customs violations."3 Answers received to various ques-
tions during the inspection amounted to probable cause to believe
that a crime was being or had been committed. The court also re-
jected all arguments of the defendants which would have sub-
jected the Coast Guard to Treasury Department regulations that
required probable cause before such a search could be under-
taken."' Judge Fay, the writer of the original panel's opinion,
dissented on much the same grounds as he had relied upon in his
first opinion, noting
'" The text of 14 U.S.C. § 141b (1976) reads:
(b) The Coast Guard, with the consent of the head of the agency concerned, may
avail itself of such officers and employees, advice, information, and facilities of
any Federal agency, State, Territory, possession, or political subdivision thereof,
or the District of Columbia as may be helpful in the performance of its duties. In
connection with the utilization of personal services of employees of state or local
governments, the Coast Guard may make payments for necessary traveling and
per diem expenses as prescribed for Federal employees by the standardized
Government travel regulations.
112 578 F.2d 1058, 1067 (5th Cir. 1978).
'Id. at 1065.
... Id. at 1067-1069. Under 14 U.S.C. § 89b (1976) Coast Guard officers are deemed to be
agents of the particular executive department whose laws they are enforcing and therefore
subject to the rules and regulations of that department. In enforcing customs law, the Coast
Guard, then, acts as agents of the Treasury Department. The Treasury Department has
promulgated regulation 19 C.F.R. § 162.3 (1977), which allows customs officials to go on
board American vessels upon the high seas at anytime, where there is probable cause to
believe that a law of the United States is being or has been violated The court rejected
the defendant's argument that this regulation mandated that the Coast Guard at least
establish probable cause before boarding. Relying upon section 89c which states that the pro-
visions of section 89 are in addition to any powers conferred by law, and not in limitation of
any powers already conferred upon Coast Guard officers, the court said that since the Coast
Guard is empowered to seize and board vessels of the American flag on the high seas
without probable cause or any particularized suspicion, the customs regulation could not
restrict its already existent powers. Id. at 1067.
The defendants next contended that 14 U.S.C. § 143 which declared Coast Guard officers
to be customs officials and charged them with the responsibility of submitting to
customs and treasury regulations, subjects the Coast Guard to the probable cause require-
ments of 19 C.F.R. § 162.3. The court stated that section 143 should not be read as a limita-
tion on the Coast Guard's powers to board American vessels beyond the 12 mile limit.
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[a] close examination of section 89a reveals that it would
authorize the Coast Guard to seize any American vessel
anywhere in the world without probable cause and for no pur-
pose whatsoever than to conduct a full scale search for possible
drug or other criminal violation."5
Judge Fay also questioned the majority's opinion in light of
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.' Other courts have also analogized
these Coast Guard inspections to administrative inspections." 7 A
brief discussion of analyses by courts outside of the Fifth Circuit
is instructive.
B. Vessel Cases outside the Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit appears to be the only circuit to have sanc-
tioned these warrantless searches pursuant to section 89a.
Several jurists both within and without the Fifth Circuit have
questioned the legality of this interpretation.
Judge Rubin, in U.S. v. Whitmire,"8 a case involving a check by
customs officials of a boat after it had docked, wrote in his concur-
ring opinion that the decision in Warren must be re-examined in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Delaware v. Prouse."9 In
the Ninth Circuit, the case of U.S. v. Piner"' concerned the Coast
Guard's random stop and boarding of a vessel for a safety and
regulation inspection without probable cause to believe that a
violation of United States law was occurring. The stop, made after
dark, resulted in the discovery of two tons of marijuana found in
plain view. 2' Judge Schwarzer of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California ordered suppression of the
evidence seized, and stated:
[a] series of decisions by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
relied upon by the government appears to have treated vessel
1" 578 F.2d at 1080.
110 Judge Fay wrote: "It would be interesting to consider the effect the Supreme Court's
recent opinion in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. (1978) has on the propriety of even an adminis-
trative stopping for the limited purpose of a safety and documentary check .... Is it possi-
ble that a warrantless search limited in scope to safety violations is not justified under the
fourth amendment?" 578 F.2d at 1083, n. 3.
"' See, e.g., United States v. One 43 Foot Sailing Vessel, 405 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Fla. 1975)
affd 538 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631 (D.P.R. 1978);
United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978).
"' 595 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1979).
'9 Id at 1320, n. 6.
1 452 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
111 Id at 1337.
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safety as beyond the purview of the fourth amendment . . .
Although the earlier of the cited decisions imply a view that
these safety inspections are not subject to fourth amendment
scrutiny, the quoted statement in Warren as well as Supreme
Court decisions hereinafter discussed, compel the conclusion
that Coast Guard safety inspections must pass muster under the
fourth amendment.'22
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,'23 the decision
of the district court was upheld primarily on the strength of Mar-
shall v. Barlows, Inc.' 4 and Delaware v. Prowse.'25
C. Analogous Search and Seizure Cases
Neither Marshall v. Barlows, Inc. nor Delaware v. Prouse dealt
specifically with the question of search and seizure upon the high
seas. However, as the aforementioned jurists have noted, contained
within each case is critical fourth amendment analysis in areas
closely analogous to search and seizure of vessels upon the high
seas.126
In Marshall, the Secretary of Labor sought to enforce section
8a'" of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA),
which provided for inspections checking for OSHA violations
without explicitly requiring a "search warrant or other process"1 28
in much the same manner as section 89a. An agent of the Labor
'"ld. at 1338 and n. 5. The quoted statement in Piner was from the first panel's decision in
the Warren case which was later overruled by the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc.
" 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979).
.. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
-2 U.S. - , 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
12 See denial of rehearing, United States v. Cadena, 588 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir. 1979),
where the court said: "The inherent mobility of a vessel on the seas justifies the analogy we
have drawn from the automobile cases."
See also 452 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1979); 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979).
"Y The text of section 8 reads:
1. "In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon
presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is
authorized -
"(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establish-
ment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is
performed by an employee of an employer; and
"(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other
reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any
such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, ap-
paratus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any
such employer, owner, operator, agent, or employee." 84 Stat. 1598, 29 U.S.C. §
657(a).
"2 436 U.S. 302, 310 (1978).
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Department called upon Mr. Barlow at his business and requested
an opportunity to inspect. Mr. Barlow was told that no complaints
had been made against him or his shop and that he had simply
turned up in the "agency's selection process."'29 Mr. Barlow, in
reliance upon the fourth amendment guarantees, refused to allow
the inspection when he learned the agent had no warrant. An
order was subsequently obtained from the district court compel-
ling Mr. Barlow to allow the inspection, but again Mr. Barlow
refused permission for the search. Mr. Barlow then sought injunc-
tive relief against the warrantless searches permitted by OSHA.
A three judge district court panel ruled in favor of Mr. Barlow.13 °
The Secretary of Labor appealed the decision claiming war-
rantless inspections to enforce OSHA to be reasonable within the
meaning of the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Quoting Camera v. Municipal
Court,'3' the Supreme Court said: "except in certain carefully
defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper
consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant."'32 The prohibition against unreasonable searches
was said to protect citizens from warrantless intrusions during
civil and criminal investigations. "If the government intrudes
upon private property, the privacy interest suffers whether the
government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal
laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards."'' 3
The Court then acknowledged the Secretary's contention that
an exclusion from the search warrant mandate exists for "per-
vasively regulated business" and "closely regulated industries
long subject to close supervision and inspection."'3 4 This principle,
known as the Biswell-Colonnade exception, applies in industries
which have such a history of governmental oversight and regula-
tion that "no reasonable expectation of privacy could exist for a
proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise. '"135
In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of stopping and searching an automobile without a warrant or
probable cause. Though he had observed neither traffic or equip-
'"5 Id.
"o 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho, 1977).
"' 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
032 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978).
Id. at 312.
13 Id at 313.
13 Id United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
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ment violations nor suspicious activity, a patrolman initiated a
"routine" traffic stop to check the driver's license and registra-
tion. The patrolman testified at trial, "I saw the car in the area
and was answering no complaints so I decided to pull them off."'36
Upon reaching the car, the patrolman seized marijuana in plain
view on the car floor. The trial court in granting a motion to sup-
press the evidence found the stop and detention to be wholly
capricious and violative of the fourth amendment. The Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed. 3 ' The state appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, which, in quoting from United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce'38 upholding roving patrols searching for illegal
aliens near international borders, wrote: "[e]xcept at the border
and its functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may stop
vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts,
together with rational inferences from those facts, that reason-
ably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may
be illegally in the country."'39 The Court declared that passengers
and operators of automobiles do not lose their "reasonable expec-
tations of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are
subject to government regulation."'"" In conclusion that Court
held that:
[e]xcept in those situations in which there is at least an ar-
ticulate and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or
that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle
or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violations of
law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to
check the driver's license and the registration of the automobile
are unreasonable under the fourth amendment."'
The rationale used in these cases is that, except in certain
unusual circumstances involving "closely regulated industries
long subject to close supervision and inspection," an enforcement
officer is no.t justified in initiating a routine search or seizure
unless he Aias probable cause, a warrant, or the functional
equivalent of a warrant. The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has
reached the conclusion that an initial stop by the Coast Guard
upon the high seas is constitutional if made pursuant to the
1- U.S. .- 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1394 (1979).
"7 382 A.2d 1359 (Del. 1978).
18 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
18 - U.S. .. 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1397 (1979).
1-8 U.S. __, 99 S. Ct., 1394-1400.
-- U.S. __,99 S. Ct., 1404.
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authority of section 89a. No probable cause, warrant, or its equiv-
alent is necessary under its construction of the statute.
D. The Fifth Circuit, Administration Necessity and Biswell
The Fifth Circuit has couched the Coast Guard's inspections in
terms of administrative necessity.142 However, it has overlooked
the essential prerequisites articulated in the cases which initially
established the exception for administrative inspections. The
Supreme Court held in U.S. v. Biswell"I that "where . .
regulatory inspections further urgent federal interest, and the
possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of im-
pressive dimensions the inspection may proceed without a war-
rant where specifically authorized by statute."'4
Considering the Fifth Circuit's interpretations of the authority
granted by section 89a, articulable doubts surface concerning all
four of the Biswell requirements. Because the boardings can be ac-
complished without a warrant or probable cause, the possibilities
of abuse of authority by the Coast Guard are tremendous and the
privacy expectation that mariners rightfully carry suffers.
Although section 89a does authorize searches of vessels upon the
high seas, these searches do not meet either fourth amendment or
administrative warrant standards. In addition, the government
does not appear historically to have exercised such pervasive con-
trol over ships at sea to now justify an application of the Biswell-
Colonnade exception.
1. Federal interest
If there is an urgent federal interest to be protected when the
Coast Guard boards to conduct safety and documentary inspec-
tions, it should be safety of vessels. "5 But, when vessels are boarded
... See note 117, supra. Also, for a forceful argument that an administrative exception
should be made for searches of vessels upon the high seas, see Carmichael, At Sea with the
Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 51 (1977).
406 U.S. 311 (1972).
406 U.S. at 317.
... In each of the following cases, the Coast Guard told the defendants aboard the vessel
that the purpose of the visit was to make a Coast Guard inspection: United States v. One 43
Foot Sailing Vessel, 405 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Fla. 1975) aff'd at 538 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Hillstrom, 533 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d
339 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978).
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200, " 500, "7 and 700148 miles from the closest American shore, or
when traveling away from the United States, "9 one must ask what
urgent federal interests are furthered by the Coast Guard's in-
spection for safety and documentary violations. It is doubtful that
the government's interest in vessel safety is so high that if a
vessel 700 miles at sea were found to be in substantial violation,
the Coast Guard would immediately remove the occupants from
the vessel and tow the vessel back to shore. After all, it seems
that if the Coast Guard adopted a system of mandatory stops of all
American vessels within the 12 mile limit for safety and documen-
tary inspections, it could more effectively insure the safety of
American flag vessles upon the high seas. Or, perhaps the govern-
ment's urgent interest lies in an area other than vessel safety.
The many cases cited within this Note in which the Coast Guard
boarded a vessel to conduct inspections pursuant to section 89a
have involved situations where marijuana was being smuggled
into the United States. If the true interest behind the inspections
is to look for narcotics, this is an abuse of even the administrative
inspection.
2. Possibilities of abuse
Upon boarding of the vessel, it is the general practice of the
Coast Guard, to tell the crew that its purpose is to conduct a
routine Coast Guard inspection."5 As a result, according to the
Fifth Circuit, no search warrant or probable cause is necessary
prior to boarding. Theoretically, once aboard the vessel, the Coast
Guard has no authority to extend the search into any other areas
unrelated to the safety and documentation inspection unless cir-
cumstances arise during the course of the inspection that create
probable cause.151 However, the Coast Guard engages in activity
which generates probable cause for expanded searching when it
carries agents of other law enforcement departments to sea with
its vessels and as part of the documentary inspection it goes into
the hull of the vessels to ascertain their identification numbers.
This appears to be a clear abuse of the administrative inspection
and a violation of the constitutional rights of mariners.
"4 United States v. One 43 Foot Sailing Vessel, 405 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Fla., 1975).
117 United States v. Hillstrom, 533 F.2d 209 (5th Cir., 1976).
... United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir., 1978).
149 Id.
" See note 145 supra.
... United States v. Warren, 550 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1977).
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The Coast Guard is authorized by statute to carry with it other
agents or officers of other federal departments to assist in the en-
forcement of its duties. As a result of this authorization, agents of
customs and narcotics enforcement departments may accompany
the Coast Guard to sea.'52 These agents can board vessels with the
Coast Guard inspection teams and conduct independent searches
of their own, for violations which their departments will handle,
under the guise of the Coast Guard's safety and documentary in-
spection.153 Sometimes, as in the Warren case, it is the enforce-
ment agents who actually uncover damaging evidence.
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit has not demanded that the agents
identify themselves or possess search warrants before they are
allowed to pursue their independent searches. For the Fifth Cir-
cuit, the fact that these agents boarded the vessels with the Coast
Guard has been sufficient to bring their actions within the aegis of
the Coast Guard's authority to inspect.'54 It has not mattered that
the agents' actions have deviated far beyond the legitimate needs
of a safety and documentary inspection.
Even if additional law enforcement agents are present, their
services may not be necessary. As part of the Coast Guard's
documentations inspection, officers go into the hull of the vessel
to check the identification number on the frame. The hull of the
vessel is the place where cargo of any substantial quantity is nor-
mally kept. Therefore, in checking the hull, anything suspicious
and in plain view would give rise to probable cause for the Coast
Guard to search further under the plain view doctrine.55 Quan-
tities of marijuana, like any other substance, controlled or other-
wise, are kept in the hull of the vessel. By always checking the
hull, the Coast Guard will nearly always uncover the hidden
substance. Then the Coast Guard has license to search further for
incriminating evidence.
3. Expectation of privacy
The most abhorrent aspect to this continuum of circumstance is
the manner in which the Coast Guard is initially able to procure
1 See note 111 supra.
1 United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir., 1978). United States v. Hillstrom,
533 F.2d 209 (5th Cir., 1976).
15 United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1067 (5th Cir., 1978).
The plain view doctrine holds that if the law enforcement official was lawful in his in-
itial intrusion, other damaging or other incriminating evidence discovered during the intru-
sion is admissible into a court of law. Coolidge v. N. Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
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access to the vessel. All that it has to do is to decide to conduct a
routine safety and documentation inspection-an inspection that
the Fifth Circuit has characterized as administrative and
therefore requiring no warrant or probable cause. There are no
safeguards to prevent the Coast Guard from randomly selecting a
vessel and under the guise of an administrative inspection in-
itiating a safety inspection with the ulterior motive of searching
for narcotics violations. This procedure allows the Coast Guard to
circumvent fourth amendment requirements and, in the process,
injures the expectations of privacy that mariners have while
aboard their vessels.
Owners and passengers of vessels have reasonable expectations
of privacy which are destroyed by routine and random inspections
designed to uncover incriminating evidence. "The ship is the
sailor's home. There is hardly the expectation of privacy even in
the curtained limousine or the stereo-equipped van that every
mariner or yachtsman expects aboard his vessel.' '.. "The measure
of privacy that may be expected by those aboard a vessel man-
dates careful scrutiny both of probable cause for the search and
the exigency of the circumstances excusing the failure to secure a
warrant."'5 7 As the Supreme Court declared while speaking of
automobiles in Prouse, passengers and operators do not lose their
"reasonable expectations of privacy simply because the auto-
mobile and its use are subject to government regulation."'5 8 It
would seem that vessels should be treated in a like manner.
4. Authorization by statute
The last requirement in Biswell was that the warrantless
search be specifically authorized by statute. Although searches are
specifically authorized by section 89a,5 9 there are no guidelines
15 United States v. Cadena, 578 F.2d 100, 101 (1979).
157 578 F.2d at 102.
-- U.S. -, 99 S.C. 1391, 1394 (1979).
It is not entirely clear whether the search or the warrantless search is the thing that
must be authorized by statute. It is apparent that the search aboard American vessels upon
the high seas is authorized by section 89a, but that section is silent as to warrant re-
quirements.
For an excellent contrast, see United States v. Tsuda Maru, 470 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Alaska
1979) where it was held that the fourth amendment did not bar a warrantless search of a
Japanese fishing vessel to protect the fisheries conservation zone established by the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. In reaching its decision, the court con-
strued 16 U.S.C. §§ 1861(b) (1976), which states:
any officer who is authorized to enforce the provisions of this chapter may-
(1) With or without a warrant or other process -
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enumerated within that statute for the Coast Guard to adhere to
while conducting inspections or searches pursuant to section 89a.
The reasonableness of the search necessarily will be decided by
the Coast Guard, at high sea, whenever officers decide to board
and inspect a vessel.6 0 Therefore, in the absence of statutory
guidelines, fourth amendment standards should be met. "Where
Congress has authorized inspections but made no rules governing
the procedure that inspectors must follow, the fourth amendment
and its various restrictive rules apply. '161
5. The history of regulation of vessels on the high seas: a
tradition of probable cause?
The history of the government's control over vessels upon the
high seas does not support an application of the Biswell-Colonnade
exception to searches upon the high seas. Historically there are
several statutes dealing with searches of vessels. A statute of
1789 dealing with seizure of vessels stated:
[a]nd when any prosecution shall be commenced on account of
the seizure of any ship or vessel, goods, wares or merchandize
and judgment shall be given the claimant or claimants; if it shall
appear to the court before whom such prosecution shall be tried,
that there was a reasonable cause of seizure, the same court
shall cause a proper certificate of entry to be made thereof, and
in such case, the claimant shall not be entitled to costs, nor shall
the person who made the seizure or the prosecutor be liable to
action, judgment ... or prosecution.'
In an act to provide more effectually for the collection of duties,
Congress provided that all collectors, naval officers and sur-
veyors, or other persons specifically appointed would have "full
power and authority to enter any ship or vessel, in which they
(A) arrest any person, if he has reasonable cause to believe that such person
has committed an act prohibited by section 1857 of this title
(B) board, and search or inspect, any fishing vessel ....
(C) seize any fishing vessel (together with its fishing gear, furniture, ap-
purtenances, stores, and cargo) used or employed in, or with respect to
which it reasonably appears that such vessel was used or employed in,
the violation of any provision of this chapter .... (emphasis added)
Thus, the statute under construction in Tsuda Maru, specifically authorized the war-
rantless search which section 89a is unable to do.
' Without the benefit of predetermined standards, Coast Guard officers in the field will
be left to make discretionary, arbitrary and erratic searches and seizures upon the high
seas. This situation, as it pertains to statutes, has been held violative of the U.S. Constitu-
tion in Papachristou et al v. City of Jacksonville, 406 U.S. 156, 162 (1971).
... Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
1621 Stat. 47, ch. 5, sec. 36 (1789) (emphasis added).
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shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise sub-
ject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search for, seize and
secure any such goods, wares or merchandise . . .""6 These
statutes enacted by the first Congress required that probable
cause be established before action could be initiated by enforce-
ment officials.
However, in 1866, Congress enacted a statute aimed at the
prevention of smuggling. The statute applied to activity within 4
leagues (12 miles) of the coast and gave customs officers access to
any vessel, person, trunk or envelope on board without an express
requirement that probable cause or a warrant be obtained prior to
boarding.14 In 1930, the immediate predecessor to 19 U.S.C. §
1581165 was enacted, authorizing collectors, naval officers,
surveyors, inspectors and officers of the revenue cutters to board
and search vessels in any part of the United States or within 4
leagues of the coast if the vessel was bound for the United States.
Searching officers were given access to all parts of the vessel, in-
cluding the cabin, without an express requirement for a warrant
or probable cause. Although this expansive authority to search
seems, at first glance, to support the Biswell-Colonnade exception,
we must consider two important limitations on the power confer-
red by this statute. First, the Coast Guard was only authorized to
exercise this power within 4 leagues of the United States'
coastline; and second, the vessel boarded for such purposes had to
be bound for or already within the United States. That these lat-
ter two statutes were directed toward the protection of the
United States' coast is plausible in view of the limitations placed
upon their applications.'6
In U.S. v. Maul,'67 Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote in a concurring
opinion that "there is no limitation upon the right of the sovereign
to seize without a warrant vessels registered under its laws
similar to that imposed by common law and the Constitution upon
lO 1 Stat. 170, ch. 35, sec. 48 (1790) (emphasis added).
"' 14 Stat. 178, ch. 201, sec. 2 (1866).
"' The Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 590, ch. 497.
", Even today, if the Coast Guard were forced to curtail searches and seizures of vessels
upon the high seas where it carried neither a valid search warrant or probable cause, the
Coast Guard as officers of the customs, 14 U.S.C. § 89b, (1976) could still take advantage of
statutes designed to prevent smuggling into the United States. Searches pursuant to these
statutes might be conducted under border search standards and as such, might not require
a search warrant or probable cause. See 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1976); U.S. v. Stanley, 545 F.2d
661 (9th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Ingham, 502 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1974). Such a search would prob-
ably have to be restricted to within the 12 mile limit.
17 274 U.S. 501, 512 (1927).
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the arrest of persons and upon the seizure of papers and
effects."'6 8 However, that statement falls short of addressing the
issue of probable cause. In U.S. v. Lee,'69 decided the same day as
Maul, the government argued that the Coast Guard had authority
to search and seize an American vessel on the high seas beyond
the 12 mile limit when probable cause exists that a law of the
United States has been violated.'70 Mr. Justice Brandeis, this time
writing for a unanimous court, said "it is fairly to be inferred that
officers are likewise authorized to board and search vessels when
there is probable cause to believe them subject to seizure for
violation of revenue laws, and to arrest persons thereon engaged
in such violation."'' These cases illustrate that while the govern-
ment contended and the Court accepted the idea that no warrant
was required for the search and seizure of an American vessel by
the Coast Guard, both the government and the Court acknow-
ledged the fact that probable cause to believe that a law of the
United States was being or had been violated must be established
before an otherwise warrantless search would be valid.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has examined the two-pronged attack often asserted
by defendants in Fifth Circuit cases involving vessel searches:
that the Coast Guard lacked authority over the particular area
where their vessel was searched; and that the search conducted
did not comport with the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment. Fifth Circuit decisions, though consistent, are open to
criticism on both issues. The case law of that circuit reveals an in-
creasingly expansive interpretation of the Coast Guard's authority
to search vessels: from United States vessels on the high seas to
foreign vessels thereon, and from United States vessels in foreign
waters possibly, it is suggested, to foreign vessels in foreign
waters. These expansions do not have a sound basis in the
language or legislative history of section 89a, nor in the pertinent
treaties.
The constitutional attack on the manner in which the Coast
Guard searches have been carried out has been rejected on the
grounds of administrative necessity and broad authority under
section 89a. Even if such authority is assumed, however, the
,I Id. at 524.
274 U.S. 559 (1927).
170 Id at 562, (emphasis added).
"' Id., (emphasis added).
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absence of statutory guidelines for searches suggests that
guidelines must be found in the fourth amendment. The court
created rules found in the cases involving administrative searches
would appear to be applicable to Coast Guard searches of vessels
as well. Lack of an urgent federal interest, the possibilities for abuse
where criminal investigations are carried out under the guise of
administrative searches, the expectation by mariners of their
right of privacy, and the lack of either express statutory
authorization or guidelines for warrantless searches are reasons
which suggest the need for a more careful fourth amendment
analysis by the Fifth Circuit. Underlying these reasons is a credi-
ble United States tradition of probable cause standards for vessel
searches. If the Fifth Circuit, with its case law of expanded
jurisdiction and restricted fourth amendment analysis, is to avoid
the charge that it is more concerned with suppressing narcotics
traffic than with properly interpreting statutes, treaties and the
Constitution, then some limitations on jurisdiction and searches
must be found.
Willie R. Jenkins
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